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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

a real clearing hourse for the ideas of the bar and perform a function which few state law quarterlies are able
to perform because they do not have supporting them such
an active and interested bar as there is in West Virginia.
Needless to say in asking for comment on the various
proposals discussed in the Quarterly the editorial staff desires adverse comment as well as favorable comment. It is
only by publishing the adverse opinions as well as the
favorable opinions on any proposition that any real benefit
can be accomplished.
SUBSCRIPTIONS TO STOCK IN A CORPORATION '1O BE

ORGAN-

IZED.1-A group of personh may acquire the privilege of being
a corporation by organization under the general corporation statutes but since the corporation to be formed must
,have stockholders, subscriptions to the stock must be
secured in advance. This is commonly done by drawing up
a subscription paper and having the subscribers sign the
same. Under our law these subscribers cannot be bound
by contract to a non-existent corporation. The courts in
suits involving subscriptions to stock in corporations to be
formed, have usually held that the subscription amounts
to an offer by the subscriber to the corporation to take the
amount of stock indicated, which offer the corporation,
after it comes into being, may accept or reject, but being
a mere offer it is revocable by the subscriber at any time
2
before its acceptance by the corporation.
The corporate promoter is a relatively new legal phenomenon.8 Prior to his appearance on the scene as an active business agency, the law had not had to deal with any
situation where a person was negotiating and entering into
large and important business arrangements for the benefit
of a legal personality yet to be brought into existence but
which such person, if his scheme succeeds, can bring into
being. Hence the difficulty in fitting the activities of the
promoter into the mosaic of legal rules and principles. But
presumably the promoter is with us to stay, and since some
I The discussion does not include subscribers who sign the corporation paper as
subscribers under the provisions of Ch. 54 §6 of the CODE. Such subscribers must be
held bound from the time such incorporation paper Is filed. See Greenbrier Industrial
E:xp. v. Rodes, 37 W. Va. 738, 17 S. E. 305 (1893).
2 See 14 C. 3. 512-13; MACHEN, CORPS., §249.
2 See Isaacs, "The Promoter-A Legislative Problem," 38 HARv. L. REv. 887.
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one has to assume the burden of organizing new corporate
enterprises,'it is only fair that the law afford the promoter
some means of binding the subscribers to their promises in
an effective manner.4 It will be assumed that it is desirable that the law do this. The question is how may this
result be best accomplished?
So far as the cases in this state go there appears to be no
serious obstacle in the way of working out such result
provided the courts can be persuaded the result is desirable,5 but no one has so far shown the way. Such subscription contracts as happen to be quoted in the decided cases
in the state show little evidence of any attempt to so bind
the subscriber., While it may be uncertain whether it is
possible to draft a subscription contract which the courts
will hold effectively binds the subscriber to perform his
promise, it is certain that there is nothing to be lost by
making the attempt, and if the attempt be intelligently
made there seems an excellent chance of success.
It will occur to almost any lawyer that the subscription
paper may be so worded as to make the various subscribers
contract with each other to take the various amounts of
stock as promised,7 yet this is almost useless, since if one
subscriber makes a breach the others can neither specifically enforce the contract, nor can they usually recover
more than nominal damages. Certainly they cannot recover the full amount of the subscription. The same is
also to be said as to making a contract between the subscriber and the promoter, for if the latter sues at law for a
breach he will be unable to secure as damages anything
near this amount of the subscription, and frequently he
will get no more than nominal damages.
It is plain that any effective means of binding the sub' "Not less apparent than the legal right to take subscriptions is the utility of the
procedure. The procurement of articles of incorporation and the organization effected
under them, involve labor and expense. Hence it is both advantageous and desirable to
have a guaranty of the success of the proposed organization before entering upon it.
This is no more than an ordinary business precaution, the right to which ought not to
be denied in the absence of a legal prohibition thereof." Windsor Hotel Co. v. Schenk,
76 W. Va. 1, 5. 84 S. E. 911 (1916).
5 See Martin v. Cushwa, 86 W. Va. 615, 104 S. E. 97 (1920) ; Martin v. Rothwell.
81 W. Va. 681. 95 S. E. 189 (1918) ; Windsor Hotel Co. v. Schenk. aupra, n. 4; Clarksburg Board of Trade Land Co. v. Davis, 77 W. Va. 70, 86 S. E. 929 (1916) ; Greenbrier
Industrial Exp. v. Rodes, supra, n. 1; Railroad Co. v. Applegate, 21 W. Va. 172 (1882);
Kimmins v. Wilson, 8 W. Va. 584 (1876).
a No serious attempt seems to have been made to draft a contract under which the
subscribers may be prevented from withdrawing without the consent of promoters or
other subscribers before incorporation is completed.
, See 14 C. J. 526.
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scriber must be one under which the full amount of the
subscription may be recovered-in effect specific enforcement of the subscription contract. Under the present well
settled law if the corporation is duly formed and accepts
the subscriber's offer, it may then tender the stock and
recover the amount of the subscription in an action at law,8
thus in effect securing specific enforcement, so if some way
can be devised by which the corporation may complete the
contract or may enforce payment of the promised amount
the desired result may be accomplished. A sealed offer 9
running to the proposed corporation would be of doubtful
value for, while an offer under seal is generally held irrevocable, 10 yet the sealed instrument must take effect on
delivery and at that time a designated obligee must exist."
A sealed contract between subscriber and promoter would
probably not be of any advantage whatever since, there is
here usually no difficulty in so drawing the agreement as to
furnish sufficient consideration to support the promise of
the subscriber and thus bind him by simple contract.
1. It has been suggested that if the subscription contract
binds the subscriber to the promoter, it is a contract made
for the benefit of the proposed corporation, and therefore
the corporation after organization may sue on said contact
as a beneficiary. 1 2 Our Court of Appeals has said such a
contract is enforceable under our sole beneficiary statute, 18
but it may be argued that such contract is not made for the
sole benefit of the corporation and hence will not fall within
See 14 C. J. 537; Railroad v. Applegate, supra, n. 5.
The effect of seals is abolished as contracts involving real estate.
Ch. '2, §26.

W. VA. CoDE

'0 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (2d ed.) §61.
'A WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (2nd. ed.) §215; Hudson Real. Est. Co. v. Tower, 161
Mass. 10, 36 N. E. 680 (1894).
12 See cases cited in MACHEN, CORPS., §249.
"5 "The subscribers do not promise to pay one another. On the contrary each

promises to pay the corporation the amount of his subscription and no other person.
The promise is clearly one for the sole benefit of the corporation to be formed and
brings it within the scope and operation of §2, ch. Il1 CODE, serial §3740. That the
corporation had at the date of the contract only a potential existence, seems to be
immaterial." Windsor Hotel Co. v. Schenk, supr,' n. 4. at page 6.
To the effect that it is not necessary that the beneficiary be in existence at the time
the beneficiary contract is made see WILLISTOSN,

CONTRACTS, §378.
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the statute. 1 4 But assuming the corporation may sue as
beneficiary on the contract between subscriber and promoter, can it recover the amount of the subscription as
damages? Suppose the subscriber, before the organization of the corporation declares to the promoter he will
never perform. Since the time of performance is still in
the future, this can be treated by the promoter as an anticipatory breach of the contract but is the promoter compelled
to so treat it? The point is in doubt. It is arguable that he
may treat the contract as still in force, bring the corporation into being and it then may consider the contract as
still existing. Failure by the subscriber to pay, when payment was actually due, would be an actual breach of the
contract for which the corporation should be able to sue
and recover full damages. 15 This would then be a method
by which the desired result might possibly be accomplished.
Its chief defects lie in the doubt as to whether it is a sole
beneficiary contract and within the statute, and in whether
or not the corporation 'could recover the full amount of
this subscription as damages.
2. The contract between the subscriber and the promoter may be so worded and to make it clear the subscriber,
for a valuable consideration moving from the promoter,
makes an offer to the proposed corporation to subscribe
for stock, the offer to remain open a stated time. This
would seem to give to the proposed corporation an option
14 While the Court of Appeals in Windsor Hotel Co. v. Schenk, supra, n. 4, said such
a contract falls within the statute, the point is certainly arguable. Machen asserts the
contract is clearly not solely for the benefit of the proposed corporation. See MACHEN.
COPS., §249. But his argument is that the promoters and subscribers have great interest in enforcing the contract. This is true enough but it must be noted that the direct
benefit is to the proposed corporation and nothing will even be payable unless it is duly
organized. The promise thus runs directly to it. The benefit which the promoter and
other subscribers will derive comes indirectly as a result of the formation of the corporation. The contract seems not to belong either to the debtor-creditor type or the
sole beneficiary type of beneficiary contract. See note in THE BAR, Nov. 1916, 424. If a
contract is not a sole beneficiary contract-if the other party has a pecuniary interest in
its performance, though an indirect one, then this sort of contract does not fall within tl'e
statute and the court's dictum seems erroneous.
* Logically the mere fact one party chooses to repudiate before the time for performance ought not necessitate a recognition of such repudiation as a final breach of
the contract, and in England it seems to be so held. Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. 111
(1872). But in this country it ts held, that after breach the injured party must not go
on with the contract, where the result will be to enhance the damages, and by reason
of the application of this rule of damages a result contra to the English view is reached
in very many cases. But this particular rule of damages does not prevent the injured
party proceeding where the result will be to lessen the damages. At least in the case
of the subscription under discussion there is a siriou question whether or not the
promoter must treat repudiation as a breach or whether he may go on with the corporate organization and refuse to recognize such breach. Unless the corporation can
sue on the contract and recover the amount of the subscription, this theory is not of
great value. As to whether or not the repudiation must be recognized by the injuped
party, see WILLISTON, 'CONTRACTS, §§1298, 1299.
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to accept the subscription at any time before the option

expires. Since an option given by one contracting party to
the other for a valuable consideration is irrevocable, 1 no
reason is seen why the fact the offer or option runs to a
third party-the proposed corporation--should change the

rule. 17 If this option is irrevocable by the subscriber then
the corporation after it comes into existence may accept it,
thus making a contract between the subscriber and the
corporation, which the latter may sue upon and recover
the amount of the subscription. Here then is a second
method by which the desired result might possibly be accomplished.
3. Another method is to have the subscriber contract
with the promoter and in said contract have the subscriber
expressly make the promoter his attorney to make the sub-

scription for the subscriber after the corporation comes
into being, with an express stipulation that this power of
attorney is to be irrevocable. Declaring a power of attorney

is to be irrevocable of course does not necessarily make it
so, but such declaration may neverfheless be an aid in inducing a court to so hold.18 At least it makes the intention
of the parties clear. There is authority to the effect that a
power of attorney such as suggested above is irrevocable by

the subscriber, 9 though probably these cases go about as

far as any in the books in holding powers of attorney irrevocable. 2 But if we are right in assuming the subscriber
ought to be held to his promise, then there seems no reason
16 See WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §61.
"4 That where there is a contract among subscribers to take stock this constitutes an offer to the corporation which is irrevocable, see Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Davis, 40 Minn. 110, 41 N. W. 1026 (1889) ; Nebraska Chickory Co. v. Lednicky, 79 Neb. 587, 118 N. W. 245 (1907). Contra are usually
cited Packet Co. v. Webb, 156 Ala. 551, 46 So. 977 (1908) ; Bryant's Pond SteamMill Co. v. Felt, 87 Me. 234, 32 At!. 888 (1895) ; Hudson Real Est. Co. V. Tower,
161 Mass. 10, 86 N. E. 680 (1894); Muicy Tract. Engine Co. v. Green, 143 Pa. 209,
13 At]. 747 (1888). Even in the cases in accord the right of the corporation to recover as
beneficiary, and its right to recover because it has accepted the offer or option, irrevocable because on consideration furnished by the subscribers, have not been clearly
noted by the court. The decisions are something of a reliance on both. On tte other
hand many of the cases cited as being contra, admit that if the subscriber Is bound by
contract to the other subscribers, or to the promoter, then the offer to the proposed
corporation is irrevocable. No good reason seems to be given in any of them why. If It
is clear there is a contract with the promoter by which the subscriber agrees to extend
an offer to the corporation, such offer or option should be revocable. Our court in
Windsor Hotel Co. v. Schenk, supra, n. 4, by way of dictum asserted the option would
be irrevocable.
3 MECHEM, AGENCY (2nd. ed.) §584.
15 This seems to be settled law in England
as to underwriter's contracts. Carmichael's Casd, (1896) 2 Ch. 643.
" See discussion if irrevocable powers in MECHEM, AOENCY, §§577 et acq. It
would seem this is a power coupled with a contract as given in his analysis and there.
fore might be held .rrevocable by the party during his lifetime though it would probably be revoked by his death.
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why the courts should not hold such a power of attorney
irrevocable. If it be irrevocable, then the promoter may
enter the subscription for the subscriber and the corporation may accept it, thus making a valid contract between
the subscriber and the corporation, under which the latter
could recover the amount of the promised subscription.
4. In one jurisdiction it seems established law that the
subscribers may bind themselves to pay the money over to
a trustee who undertakes to turn it over to the corporation
after organization, and to get stock in exchange for the
same, which stock he agrees to give to the subscriber, and
t nder this agreement the trustee may sue for the money
21
and recover it after the time for payment has arrived.
Furthermore the contract may be made to provide for the
payment of money at any time the parties desire, and this
need not await the completion of the corporate organization. If this should be sustained by our court it would
furnish an excellent method of procedure for the promoter,
in so far as the legal possibilities of binding the subscribers
effectively are concerned. Whether as a practical matter
subscribers could be induced to sign is another consideration.
It is not contended the above list of suggestions are exhaustive. Others as good or better may occur to the practitioner. It may be noted that the first three of the above
suggestions may be incorporated in the same subscription
paper so that the corporation, after its organization, may
assert its right against the subscriber on three distinct
theories, all of which, if the matter necessitates an action
at law, could probably be set up in one action. The language may be so worded as to (1) bind the subscriber by
contract to the promoter and to this should be added an
express statement that the contract is intended to be for
the sole benefit of the proposed corporation; (2) provide
that the subscriber therein makes an offer to the proposed
corporation said offer to remain open and irrevocable for a
stated period; (3) provide that the subscriber give to the
promoter express authority to enter into the subscription
contract with the corporation for said subscriber, with a
'I This has become
notes 86.90.

established law in California. See
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further provision declaring this power of attorney is to be
irrevocable. Needless to say such a subsciption paper ought
to be very carefully drafted. Among other things it should
make clear there is sufficient consideration supporting all
promises of the subscriber, and also that the offer to the
corporation is an option given it, supported by consideration moving from the promoter.
The fourth suggested
method of procedure probably cannot be advantageously
combined in the same subscription paper with the other
three even though the promoter were expressly named as
trustee.
In conclusion one may say that any of the above suggested methods might lead to success, but the manner in
which the Court of Appeals will look upon such an attempt
will depend largely upon the degree to which the attorneys
in charge are able to convince the court of the desirability
of having a method by which the promoter of a corporation
can bind the subscribers effectively.2 2 One might venture
to. hope that if a choice be made it will not be the beneficiary contract theory but rather one of the others. There
seems no reason why there might not be such a thing as an
irrevocable power of attorney to make a subscription contract with a corporation to be formed. Certainly a promoter may secure an option for the proposed corporation
and it should be permitted to take advantage of such option.
-JAMES
W. SIMONTON.
CHANcERY HEARINGS IN OPEN COURT.-At its meeting in
Wheeling on October 7 the West Virginia Bar Association
unanimously went on record as in favor of a proposed
amendment to §26 of chapter 131 of the present Code. This
section, as will be rerhembered, provides that chancery
causes may, by leave of the court, and by agreement of
counsel for the parties, be heard and determined in open
court. The proposed amendment provides that hereafter
they may be heard in open court by leave of the court on motion of either counsel or shall be so heard on the motion of
counsel for all parties. In other words, whereas the present situation provides for a hearing in open court on con2 But the language
of the court in Windsor Hotel Co. v. Schenk, supra, n. 4, is
encouraging.
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